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Beyond Weighing and Sifting:
Narrowing Judicial Focus as an
Alternative to Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority
INTRODUCTION
The language of the First,1 Fourteenth, 2 and Fifteenth3
Amendments to the Constitution, as well as the Civil Rights Act
of 1871,1 prescribes governmental action. The effects of these
provisions are to protect against certain forms of "state ac-
1. The First Amendment reads:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
2. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or proper-
ty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
3. Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment reads:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be- liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceed-
ing for redress.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held the phrase "under color of" is
to be interpreted so as to require a showing of "state action" similar to that
required under the Fourteenth Amendment. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787,
794 n.7 (1966).
tion. '15 The requirement of state action is a recognition that
private parties are not held to the same constitutional standards
as are governments.6 Claims that constitutional rights have
been deprived must necessarily then involve a defendant who
engaged in state action. The requirement is easily met where the
state itself is the offending party.
Where the culprit is a private party who is involved with,
supported by, or performs a function of the state, the question
becomes more difficult. Shall we hold such nominally private
persons to constitutional standards? If we do, what showing
must be made in order to find that a private party has engaged
in state action? The problem is ascertaining at what point a
private party has so clothed itself with the habiliments of the
state as to be chargeable with constitutional standards of
conduct.
The answer most often given by the courts and by commen-
tators can be found in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authori-
ty:v "only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the
non-obvious involvement of the state in private conduct be at-
tributed its true significance."
The analysis employed by the majority in Burton called for a
careful judicial scrutiny of the defendant, Eagle, for the pres-
ence of contacts between himself and the state. The Court found
the following: public financing of the parking facility which
itself leased space to the defendant; 8 rent paid by the defendant
to the Parking Authority; 9 construction of the facility on public
land;10 public funds used to acquire the land upon which the
parking facility was to be built;" leasing the premises to the
defendant was an integral part of the plan for operating the
facility;' 2 public funding for facility maintainance; 13 the fact
5. Throughout this comment the term "state action" is to be used in the
generic sense as applying to all levels of governmental action. State action is the
more familiar term and the one most frequently used by courts and scholars
alike.
6. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) first delineated the state/pri-
vate action dichotomy by holding: "It is state action of a particular character
that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject
matter of the (Fourteenth) Amendment."
7. 365 U.S..715, 722 (1961).
8. Id. at 723.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 724.
13. Id.
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that certain tax benefits allowed to the facility flowed to the
defendant;14 and the fact that the facility was dedicated to pub-
lic use.' 5 The aggregate of this evidence was then considered to
determine if the total amounted to state action. 6 After the com-
putations were complete the Court commented: "(t)he State has
so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with
Eagle that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the
challenged activity. .. .
The Burton approach, then, utilizes an aggregate analysis,
requiring a court to look at the full relationship between a pri-
vate entity and the state and then determine that state action
permeates the entire ambit of the ostensibly private entity's
actions. 8
The Burton approach has certain disadvantages. First, it re-
quires state involvement such that the private entity is trans-
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 725.
Because readily applicable formulae may not be fashioned, the conclu-
sions drawn from the facts and circumstances of this record are by no
means declared as universal truths ... a multitude of relationships
might appear to fall within the Amendment's embrace, but that, it must
be remembered, can be determined only in the framework of the par-
ticular facts and circumstances present.
17. Id.
18. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Commit-
tee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (in a suit to compel private broadcasters to accept editorial
advertisements, Chief Justice Burger, with Justices Stewart and Rehnquist
concurring, held the relationship between the FCC and CBS were not such as to
find "governmental action." The Court did not consider the FCC's involvement
with the particular CBS policy on editorial advertisements under attack); Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (court rejected a claim that a state
liquor license converted the discriminatory conduct of the club into state action.
Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority held the degree of services provided
to the club were not "significant" enough to constitute state action. This writer.
suggests that "significant" as used in this context means percentage of contacts
when compared with private actions.); Derrington v. Plummer, 204 F.2d 922 (5th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957) (a county built and equipped cafeteria
leased to a private person who discriminated as to race held to be state action);
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974) (the question presented to the
Court was the propriety of a federal injunction barring the city from letting its
recreational facilities be used by segregated private schools. The Court had
great difficulty in applying Burton analysis because it said the record of con-
tacts were not well presented. It remanded the case for further consideration
giving the lower court guidance in its deliberations by emphasizing the need for
a particularized examination of the facts of the case in light of the Burton
decision).
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formed into a state entity as that relates to its entire ambit of
activity. This would permit constitutionally egregious conduct
to go without remedy, even though the state is directly and
significantly involved with conduct which would otherwise be
constitutionally impermissible, simply because, in the aggre-
gate, such state involvement is not "substantial." Conversely,
private activity could be designated state action even though the
state had no involvement in the private acts because, in its total
operation, the private entity had quantitatively numerous state
contacts. Finally, aggregate analysis does not adequately ac-
count for a growing body of case law holding that state financial
aid alone does not amount to state action, 19 or that where par-
ticular equal protection issues are involved a lesser showing of
state involvement will amount to state action.20
19. An excellent example of this precise problem can be found in the fol-
lowing cases: Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University, 287 F. Supp. 535
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), (court held that 59.7 million dollars funnelled to the University
from the various federal agencies of a total budget of 134 million, roughly 45% of
the total, did not constitute state action). In the Howard University line of cases,
the courts held general financial support or assistance did not amount to state
action. Sanford v. Howard University, 415 F. Supp. 23 (D.D.C. 1976) (federal
funding of 58% of total budget not state action). Williams v. Howard University,
528 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (court held no state action despite "substantial
federal funding"). Greene v. Howard University, 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967),
rev'd on other grounds, 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (court held no state action
where "a large percentage of its expenses" are paid by the federal government).
When the state contributes financially to the extent of nearly 50% of the private
entity's entire operation, how can it be said there is no state action? Surely
where, but for the state, many private entities could not financially continue
operation, there must be sufficient involvement to constitute state action. This is
especially true in the case of Howard University where the University is char-
tered by the federal government and financed by Congressional appropriation.
This is a prime case for finding state action. The court in Grossner, supra, 287 F.
Supp. at 548, states its concern for holding state action where only state finan-
cial aid is involved: "otherwise, all kinds of contractors and enterprises depen-
dent on government business for much larger portions of income than those
here would find themselves charged with state action .... " The obvious re-
sponse to this concern is a simple one; why should that matter? Where the
public's funds are used, to a significant extent, by private entities, the people
have a right to expect those funds will be used according to the standards of
conduct as established in the Constitution. In an effort to avoid the harshness of
the rule, some of the circuits hold that where racial discrimination is involved,
there is a lower standard for finding state action. The better approach would
seem to be an admission by the court that state action was indeed present in
some aspects of Howard University and then look to see if the state is involved
with the particular private conduct which produced the harm. This is precisely
the approach the court took in Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
20. The issue of racial discrimination and state action has been treated by
the commentators. See, e.g., Silarel, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the
"State Action"Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855
(1966), or Bassett, The Reemergence ot the "State Action "Requirement in Race
Relations Cases, 22 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 39 (1972). This paper shall confine itself
to arguing the thesis that where racial discrimination is alleged a lesser or more
permissive standard is used to find state action.
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Burton has been extensively discussed by the commentators
and while none are particularly impressed with its analysis,
most consider it as making the best of a difficult legal problem.21
This paper will attempt to illustrate an alternative to the Burton
approach which has heretofore received little or no scholastic
recognition but which is increasingly being applied by the feder-
al courts. Additionally, the paper will seek to illustrate its appli-
cation to two lines of cases in the state action area: (1) financial
aid and the levels required to find state action and (2) equal
protection claims that trigger a lower standard for finding state
action.
NARROWING JUDICIAL FOCUS
2 2
Beginning in 1968 a few federal courts have taken a somewhat
more precise approach in state action analysis than that utilized
in Burton. Rather than considering the private entity in the
aggregate, such courts have narrowed their focus, attempting to
ascertain the relationship of the state to the particular private
21. The Burton mechanics for state action analysis have been praised
either as the best means of accomplishing the greatest good for all, see, e.g.,
Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority-A Case Without Precedent,
61 COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1961) (the author suggests the advantage of this ap-
proach is that it allows for case-by-case resolution of problems without setting
troublesome precedents), and Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L.
REV. 3 (1961) (the article urges the case-by-case approach even though it brings
no certainty in the area), or as the only rational explanation of the myriad of
conflicting state action cases. See e.g., Note, State Action and the Burger Court,
60 VA. L. REV. 840, 841 (the authors take the position: "These cases offer no
general formulas to explain the presence of state action in the pre-Burger Court
decisions and its absence in current controversies ... [T]he Court can neither
fashion any rigid, precise formulas nor construct any criteria to serve as an
adequate standard in this area .... One widely cited article which contributes
much to ordering the state action concept is Note, State Action: Theories for
Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REV.
656 (1971). See also Bassett, The Reemergence of the "State Action" Require-
ment in Race Relations Cases, 22 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 39 (1972).
22. The term "narrowing the focus" for lack of better description was
coined by Prof. James McGoldrick in his Constitutional Law classes to define a
phenomenon where a court, in looking at a private entity to see if state action is
present, will not consider the private entity in the aggregate but rather will look
only at that point of the private entity's total activities which produced the
alleged constitutional violation. Having done this, the next step in the court's
analysis is to ascertain the proximity of the state involvement in that particular
aspect of the private entity, rather than attempting an analysis of the state/pri-
vate relationship in the aggregate.
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activity alleged to have produced the harm. In Powe v. Miles,23
seven students claimed a denial of their civil rights following
their suspension from Alfred University. The University con-
sisted of four colleges, including the College of Ceramics. Under
New York education laws, the College of Ceramics was under
contract with the state,24 which paid all expenses and allowed
the college's employees to participate in state retirement pro-
grams.25 In administration the college was part of Alfred Uni-
versity which, in all other respects, was purely a private school.
Of the seven students suspended, four of them attended the
"private sector" colleges with the remaining three attending the
College of Ceramics. 26 The Court of Appeals held, that as to
suspension of the four students attending the Liberal Arts Col-
lege, there was no state action, but as to suspension of the
students attending the College of Ceramics, there was state
action.2
7
The court's language is important:
The amount of aid Alfred receives from the state other than for the
Ceramics College is small . . . . This is a long way from being so
dominant as to afford a basis for a contention that the state is merely
utilizing private trustees to administer a state activity .... We do not
have at all a case where the wholly state-supported activity is so
dominant that the private activity could be deemed to have been
swallowed up.
28
The court could not find, by looking at Alfred University in
the aggregate, sufficient state involvement to find state action.
More important, however, was the court's comment regarding
the parameter of the state involvement:
[The] essential point [is] that the state must be involved not simply
with some activity.of the institution alleged to have inflicted injury
upon a plaintiff but with the activity which caused the harm. Putting
the point another way, the state action, not the private action, must be
the subject of complaint. 29 (emphasis added).
To find state action as to the College of Ceramics, the court
had first to narrow its focus to the activity which caused the
harm and second, determine whether state action existed as to
that particular activity. As to the College of Ceramics and the
administration of that College's policies, Alfred University was
23. 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
24. Id. at 75.
25. Id. at 76.
26. Id. at 79.
27. Id. at 80, 82.
28. Id. at 81, 82.
29. Id. at 81.
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in reality an "agent of the state. '3
0
The Powe court seemingly did not fully apply its own analy-
sis. Having narrowed the focus to the College of Ceramics the
court's next inquiry could have carefully examined the relation-
ship between the State of New York and the suspension of the
plaintiffs. Did the state condone, promote, ratify, encourage and
participate in the suspensions? Could -the action not have oc-
curred but for the State of New York? Was the College of
Ceramics so involved with the state that it was, in reality, a part
of the state education system? On these issues the opinion is less
clear and the answers most likely much closer than the decision
leads one to believe. The approach of the court, however, estab-
lishes a preferred method of state action analysis. It recognizes
that resolution of a state action question requires more careful
evaluation of a defendant than the formalistic and abstract
compilation of state contacts utilized by the Burton court.
The Ninth Circuit has taken an approach similar to that of
Powe in'Scott v. Eversole Mortuary.31 In Scott, Eversole Mor-
tuary was under contract with Mendocino County to transport
corpses to the mortuary, embalm them, prepare them for auto-
psies and provide facilities for autopsies.32 Pursuant to that
contract, Eversole picked up relatives of the plaintiff Scott who
had been killed in an auto accident .3 The decedants were all
Native Americans. The mortuary performed all services re-
quired under the contract with the state, but refused, after being
requested to do so, to provide funeral services allegedly because
the decedants were Indians.3 4
Scott filed suit alleging, among other things, discrimination
by the mortuary3 5
The court of appeals, in reviewing the trial court's dismissal
for failure to state a cause of action, affirmed, holding that
mortuary services, as contrasted with morgue services, did not
involve state action.36 The majority argued:
30. Id. at 83.
31. 522 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1975).
32. Id. at 1111.
33. Id. at 1112.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1115.
The acts complained of did not directly occur as a result of the con-
tract between the county and Eversole. Eversole performed its con-
tractual obligation with respect to the decedants without regard to
race. There is no allegation that the morgue services were refused or
substantially modified, whether due to racial bias or otherwise. Appel-
lant's claim is based upon Eversole's failure to provide funeral serv-
ices subsequent to the completion of morgue services. These, to us,
appear to be separate services and that separation is significant.
37
The approach of the court is more sharply defined by Judge
Ely in his dissent:
The majority appears to reason that when the corporate appellee
officially seized the Indian bodies under the authority conferred by
the state, embalmed the remains, and furnished the facilities for auto-
psy, all in its official capacity as the agents of the state's coroner, it
acted under the color of state law. But thereupon, say my Brothers, its
official capacity terminated, and hence, when it declined the request
of the bereaved survivors for funeral services and the purchase of
caskets for their beloved, the corporate appellee had suddenly been
transformed into a mere private person .... 38
As in Powe, the court in Scott did not evaluate the aggregate
defendant; had they done so, Judge Ely argues they would have
been compelled to find state action.39 Rather, the court nar-
rowed its focus to the conduct allegedly producing the harm and
then determined whether state action existed as to that particu-
lar activity. The analysis is much more precise and addresses
more sharply the threshold question-did denial of mortuary
services by a private mortuary constitute state action?
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Jackson v. Met-
ropolitan Edison Co. ,40 appears to use the more precise analysis
of Powe and Scott. In Jackson a public utility had cut off the
petitioner's services for nonpayment of bills. The petitioner al-
leged this was done without sufficient procedural due process.
The court, in finding no state action, looked closely at the ad-
ministrative rule which authorized termination of services to
see to what extent the state Public Utilities Commission had
supported, condoned or encouraged it. The court found:
The nature of governmental regulation of private utilities is such that
a utility may frequently be required by state regulatory scheme to
obtain approval for practices a business regulated in less detail would
be free to institute without approval from a regulatory body. Approv-
al by a state utility commission of such a request from a regulated
utility, where the commission has not put its own weight on the side of
the proposed practice by ordering it, does not transmute a practice
initiated by the utility and approved by the commission into "state
action." At most, the Commission's failure to overturn this practice
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1117.
39. Id. at 1119.
40. 419 U.S. 345 (1975).
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amounted to no more than a determination that a Pennsylvania utility
is authorized to employ such practices if it so desired.4"
The thrust of Justice Rehnquist's analysis is this: the state
involvement with the regulation under attack was non-existent.
The utility had adopted the regulation by its own authority.
There was no review of that decision by the Public Utilities
Commission nor did the Commission approve or disapprove it.
The only possible state connection lay in the grant of state
power to the utility to make rules generally, and that, according
to the majority, was insufficient state involvement to constitute
state action.42 Using Burton analysis, the dissent argued, state
action in the aggregate was clearly present.
As our subsequent discussion in Burton made clear, the dispositive
question in any state action case is not whether any single fact or
relationship presents a sufficient degree of state involvement, but
rather whether the aggregate of all relative factors compels a finding
of state responsibility.
4 3
The majority rejected that approach preferring instead to nar-
row its focus to the activity allegedly producing the harm and
searching for state connections with that.
Finally in Jackson v. American Bar Association," five law
students, who were members of the ABA's Law Student Divi-
sion, sued the ABA alleging that a change in the ABA/LSD
bylaws amounted to discrimination against them and depriva-
tion of property without due process of law.4 5 Finding no state
action present, the court held that while the ABA received "sub-
stantial state funding, ' 46 those funds went into a separate entity
known as the Fund for Public Education which had no direct
relationship to the management and operation of the ABA it-
self. Relying on Powe v. Miles,47 the court found the federal
funds in question were not involved in the activity alleged to
have produced the harm.
48
41. Id. at 357.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 360.
44. 538 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1976).
45. Id. at 830.
46. Id. at 832.
47. 407 F.2d at 81.
48. 538 F.2d at 833.
FINANCIAL AID AS AN INDICIUM OF STATE ACTION
A good illustration of the use of narrowed judicial focus can
be found in the cases testing the existence of state action where
the principle contact between the state and the defendant is in
the form of state financial aid. The issue simply stated is
whether the presence of state funds, by itself, can trigger a
finding of state action. If the federal courts were following the
Burton approach, it would seem reasonable to hypothesize that
as the private entity becomes increasingly dependant upon state
financial aid, i.e., by comparing the amount of financial aid with
total financial resources, there would be a greater likelihood of
finding state action. This is especially true where such depend-
ence allows independent financial resources to be used in other
aspects of the private enterprise. 9 Such does not appear to be
the law. Rather, the conclusion drawn by many courts is that
general state financial aid, by itself, is not enough to convert
private action into state action. There is some difficulty in pro-
perly analyzing this area of the law because there are so few
"clean cases" which squarely present this issue."° Of those cases
where financial aid is a major contact considered by the court in
determining the presence of state action, the result generally
reached is a finding of no state action. This can be demonstrated
in the following manner: looking at 17 recent state action cases
where financial aid was a principal contact considered by the
court, most courts held state action was not present regardless
of the percentage of financial aid involved. Graphically the
cases take on the following pattern:
49. That is the argument made in State Action, supra, note 21, at 674. That
author argues that such not only should be the law but, with few exceptions, is
the law.
50. Many courts distinguish the financial aid cases this way: general finan-
cial aid absent racial discrimination, will not trigger a finding of state action;
where there exists general financial aid coupled with an allegation of racial
discrimination, there will be a lower threshold for finding state action. See, e.g.,
Grunya v. George Washington University, 512 F.2d 356, 360 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Spark v. Catholic University of America, 510 F.2d 1277, 1281, 1282 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
[Vol. 5: 95, 1977]
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cited in
these footnotes
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5.5 54 55 Se 55 50 sa vs
S/A
* These cases do not give the amount of financial aid nor do they indicate
a percentage of aid in relation to total revenues.
S/A This symbol is used to indicate the court found state action present.
51. Wahba v. New York University, 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 874 (1974) (involving a private university where 20% of the funds involved in
a NIA research project was not sufficient federal involvement to find state
action as to a participant in the project).
52. Sparks v. Catholic University of America, 510 F.2d 1227 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(25% of revenues coming from the federal government were not sufficient to
find state action).
53. New York City Jaycees v. United States Jaycees, 512 F.2d 856, 858 (2d
Cir. 1975) (31.4% of national organizations' funds coming from the federal gov-
ernment were not sufficient to find state action).
54. Junior Chamber of Commerce of Kansas City, Missouri v. Missouri
Chamber of Commerce, 508 F.2d 1031 (8th Cir. 1975), citing New York Jaycees v.
United States Jaycees, 377 F. Supp. 481, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (31.4% federal
assistance to National Jaycees which in turn distributed funds nationally would
not convert private state chapters into state action).
55. Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University, 287 F. Supp. 585 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (45% of University funds from state not sufficient to find state action).
56. Simkin v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963),
(private hospital receiving Hill-Burton funds totalling 50% of cost to build the
hospital held state action).
57. Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple University, 385 F. Supp. 473, 479
(E.D. Pa. 1974) (54.2% of school's income from the state constitutes state action).
58. Sanford v. Howard University, 415 F. Supp. 23 (D.D.C. 1976) (58% feder-
al funding not sufficient to constitute state action).
59 60 d55Z 03 04 DO 56 57 58
1. Financial aid less than 50% of private financial resources
The cases at the lower end of the spectrum are fairly consis-
tent in holding no state action where the extent of financial aid
falls below the 50% mark. Such results seem fairly consistent
with a Burton form of state action analysis because the quan-
titative number of contacts are few. The results do not appear to
support the narrowed judicial focus form of analysis because
qualitative, rather than quantitative, contacts are considered
and very little state financing could amount to state action if the
state contacts are directly involved with the private conduct
complained of.
2. Financial aid exceeding 50% of private financial resources
Where the level of financial aid approaches or exceeds 50% of
the total financial resources of the private entity, the cases are
much closer. Of those cases identified where there was substan-
tial state financial aid, most held that the presence of general
financial aid was not sufficient, by itself, to trigger a finding of
state action.68 In those cases where the court did find state
action, the presence of financial aid was not considered crucial
or determinative in the court's analysis. Rather the court looked
at the state regulations accompanying the financial aid and
found state action based on the nature of the regulations.69
59. McQueen v. Drucker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971) (up to 90% of the cost of
construction comes from the state and federal governments, court found state
action).
60. Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218
(1964) (Supreme Court found that total state support for private school tuitions
amounted to state action).
61. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (Supreme Court found total
state support for school text book program amounted to state action as applied
to private schools).
62. Williams v. Howard University, 528 F.2d 658 (D.D.C. 1976) ("substantial
state funding" did not amount to state action).
63. Green v. Howard University, 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967), rev'd. on
other grounds, 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (federal financing of a "large
percentage of expenses" not state action).
64. Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc. v. United States Jay-
cees, 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974) (local distribution
of $985,000 of state funds not sufficient to find state action).
65. Blackburn University v. Fisk, 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971) (financial aid
by itself not sufficient to find state action).
66. Grunya v. George Washington University, 512 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(federal contracts and money paid pursuant thereto not state action).
67. Grafton v. Brookland Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973) (general
state aid plus $400 per graduate not sufficient to find state action).
68. See notes 49, 50, 54, 55, 57, supra.
69. In Isaacs, supra, note 57, 385 F. Supp. at 447-81, the court emphasized
that what most tipped the scales in favor of finding state action were the state
regulations accompanying the financial aid. McQueen, supra, note 59, also in-
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This grouping of cases appears in sharp contrast with Bur-
ton's aggregate analysis. Based on aggregate contacts, it would
seem reasonable that where the state is responsible for half of a
private enterprise's financial assets, such would amount to state
action. The federal courts seem to reject that argument, prefer-
ring instead to narrow their focus to find the presence of state
action at the point of conduct allegedly producing the harm.
3. Total state financial aid
At the extreme end of the spectrum, total state funding will,
by itself, result in a finding of state action under either theory of
state action analysis. At this point the private entity is so en-
twined in the arms of the state that the differentiation between
state action and private action can no longer be made.7 0 The
private entity is absorbed by the Fourteenth Amendment into
the state.
Those cases in which financial aid was the major contact
between the state and a private entity defendant illustrate that
federal courts are moving away from aggregate analysis in find-
ing state action. Even when state financial aid is a significant
element of the private entity's total assets, that alone is not
sufficient to find state action present.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS AND STATE ACTION
A hybrid specie of narrowed judicial focus has been devel-
oping over the years which involves a multi-level state action
analysis depending on the nature of the constitutional issue
involved in the plaintiff's claim. While not a pure form of nar-
rowed judicial focus, as this comment has defined that phrase, it
is a process whereby the federal courts will focus on the con-
volved extensive state regulations of the private entities conduct. In the Howard
University line of cases, the presence of large grants of federal aid, without the
attendant regulatory control over that money, was not sufficient to find state
action.
70. Both Griffin, supra, note 60 and Norwood, supra, note 61, involve total
state support. In Griffin, the state financed the cost of segregated private school
tuition. In Norwood, the state provided, free of cost, text books to private
schools.
stitutional issues of a given case and apply different levels of
state action analysis depending on the issues involved.
Commentators have been arguing for some time that there
needs to be different state action analysis applied to equal pro-
tection cases than that which is applied to due process cases.7 '
In the area of racial discrimination, there is a growing body of
case authority indicating that when racial discrimination is one
of the plaintiffs' substantive claims, less state involvement,
qualitatively, will be needed to support a finding of state action.
In Coleman v. Wagner College,72 the Federal Court of Appeals
was presented with a charge of racial discrimination when the
college, a private school with religious affiliations and support-
ed almost totally by private funds, attempted to discipline stu-
dents according to school regulations. The first hurdle the plain-
tiffs had to overcome was the state action issue. The court in
remanding the case to the district court for a full hearing on the
state action issue said:
Racial discrimination is so peculiarily offensive and was so much the
prime target of the Fourteenth Amendment that a lesser degree of
involvement may constitute "state action" with respect to it than in
other contexts. 73 (emphasis added).
In a number of cases involving private schools, a finding of
state action has been made where allegations of racial discrimi-
nation were present even though, in factually similar due proc-
ess cases, no state action was found.74 In Jackson v. Statler
Foundation,75 Reverend Jackson sued the Foundation, alleging
racial discrimination in the selection of Foundation directors. In
considering the kinds of contacts between the state and the
Foundation, the court reviewed a number of preceding cases
and concluded that:
71. See, Antoun, Jr., State Action: Judicial Perpetuation of the State/Pri-
vate Distinction, 2 Oxio NORTHERN U. L. REV. 722 (1975) and State Action,
supra, note 21 at 858-863.
72. 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970).
73. Id. at 1127.
74. See, e.g., Grafton v. Brookland Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973);
Blackburn University v. Fisk, 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971); Grunya v. George
Washington University, 512 F.2d 556, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (the court said: "With
the possible exception of racial discrimination by recipients of government
funding, we believe mere financial support ... represents insufficient govern-
ment involvement."); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 1968) (court refused
to label private school state action for purposes of due process but indicated
that charges of racial discrimination would have subjected the school to con-
stitutional restraints); Edwards v. Habiel, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (court
recognized that private conduct might constitute state action under the Four-
teenth Amendment but not for purposes of the First Amendment). See general-
ly note 19, supra.
75. 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974).
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Significantly, these cases divide into two groups: Where racial dis-
crimination is involved, the courts have found "state action" to exist;
where other constitutional claims are at issue (due process, freedom of
speech), the courts generally have concluded no "state action" has
occured. 76
The rationale for the Statler holding is explained by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Weise v. Syracuse University.17 Relying on Stat-
ler, the court acknowledged the existence of a "double standard
in state action-one, a less onerous test for cases involving racial
discrimination and a more rigorous standard for other
claims. ' 78 The reason given for such a double standard was that
discrimination is peculiarly offensive conduct. 79 In Granfield v.
Catholic University,80 reviewing the line of cases just dis-
cussed, the court summarized what it considered to be the pres-
ent state of the law by declaring: "It has increasingly become
clear that with respect to racial discrimination, courts are will-
ing to condone less state involvement than would be permitted
in other contexts." 81
Tax exempt status has historically not been a reliable indi-
cator of the presence of state action,8 2 but in Pitts v. Depart-
ment of Revenue,83 the federal district court held that tax ex-
emptions of racially discriminatory organizations were suffi-
cient state involvement to constitute state action. In its opinion
the court said the thrust of the decision "is a determination that
a different standard must be applied in cases involving equal
protection (racial discrimination) than in cases involving other
constitutional rights."84 This is necessitated by the fact that "the
prevention of racial discrimination is dominant in any balanc-
ing of constitutional interests. '85
76. Id. at 628.
77. 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975).
78. Id. at 405.
79. Id. at 407.
80. 530 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
81. Id. at 1046 n.29.
82. See, Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d at 627-28; Wulz v. Tax
Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemption to religious groups); Chicago
Joint Board v. Chicago Tribune, 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970) (tax exempt newspa-
per); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972); Bright v. Isenburger,
314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971).
83. 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
84. Id. at 668.
85. Id. at 669.
While it seems clear that lower federal courts have adopted a
double standard in this state action area, the concept has never
formally been embraced by the Supreme Court. Indeed it
seemed at first the Court would not even deal with the issue.
Moose Lodge No. 107v. Irvis,86 presented the Court with a claim
that a private club, operating with a state liquor license, refused
to serve a black guest of one of the Lodge's members. In Moose
Lodge the majority held that state regulations granting liquor
licenses "cannot be said in any way to foster or encourage racial
discrimination. '" 87 The Court did not seem to even approach the
issue of a lesser standard for finding state action where racial
discrimination was alleged. Instead it seemed more concerned
that finding state action, where only licensing by the state is
involved, would almost obliterate the state/private dichotomy
recognized in the state action doctrine.88 Moose Lodge may be
distinguishable in a number of ways. First, it represents the
outer limits beyond which the courts will not go regardless of
the deferential treatment given to allegations of racial discrimi-
nation. Even applying the lesser standard of lower federal
courts, it is possible that a state licensing scheme, as viewed by
the majority, is never going to be a sufficient basis for a finding
of state action. Additionally., Moose Lodge may be indicative of
a balancing test used to find state action where competing asso-
ciational rights are involved. The majority went to great lengths
to balance the associational rights which permit private persons
to discriminate against the associational rights of a private per-
son in obtaining access to an all white organization. 89
In 1973 the Supreme Court in deciding Norwood v. Harri-
son,90 held unconstitutional a state program which provided
free textbooks to students in segregated private schools. While
the Court did not formally apply a lesser standard in finding
state action, there is language which arguably stands for that
proposition present in the case.
[Alithough the Constitution does not proscribe private bias, it places
no value on discrimination as it does on the values inherent in the Free
Exercise Clause. Invidious private discrimination may be charac-
terized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the
First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative con-
stitutional protections .... 91
86. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
87. Id. at 175-77.
88. Id. at 175.
89. Id. at 163.
90. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
91. Id. at 469.
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Norwood suggests that where racial discrimination is in-
volved, the Court will relax its standards for finding state action
where the remedy sought is an order directing the state to disas-
sociate itself from the private discriminator.9 z
The result in the racial discrimination cases suggests that
courts may be willing to require fewer contacts with the state
and a less direct involvement between the state and the private
conduct complained of where racial discrimination is at issue.
Such a multi-level analysis of state action problems would be
seemingly inconsistent with Burton, which considers the exist-
ence of state action to be solely a function of contacts with the
state. Under Burton, determination of the presence of state ac-
tion would preceed any consideration of the substantive issues
of a case. The approach is more akin to a narrowed judicial
focus in that it requires a court to consider carefully what con-
stitutional interests are involved so as to arrive at an initial focal
point of analysis, wide angle or relaxed scrutiny where certain
equal protection claims are raised, and extreme magnification
or strict scrutiny for substantive and procedural due process
issues.
9 3
CONCLUSION
Narrowing of judicial focus is a developing tool used by some
federal circuits. It allows the court to look closely at the private
entity and to scrutinize the specific private conduct which is
alleged to have produced the harm at issue. If, in the court's
analysis of the private action, it finds the state has sufficiently
involved itself with the action in question, there will be a finding
of state action. This analysis applies regardless of the aggregate
amount of state involvement with the private entity.a4
92. Id.
93. It is not within the scope of this comment to criticize a multi-level
approach to state action. One commentator has already argued that given the
special protection afforded to race by the Fourteenth Amendment and unique
constitutional approach to the substantive analysis of purposeful racial dis-
crimination, it is appropriate that less state involvement should trigger a finding
of state action. See generally note 21, supra; also Metropolitan Housing Devel-
opment Corporation v. City of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
94. This fact is specially recognized in Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technol-
ogy, 524 F.2d 818, 825-26 (7th Cir. 1975), where Judge Stevens, now Mr. Justice
Stevens, said:
Narrowing of judicial focus is the preferred approach for
several reasons. First, it is a more precise form of analysis. It
concentrates on the conduct or activity producing the alleged
harm rather than on the entire ambit of the private entity's
actions. Second, it is a recognition that a finding of significant
or insignificant state involvement in the aggregate is not dis-
positive of the issue. Third, such narrowed focus will require
that resolution of the state action issue not take place in a vac-
uum. Rather the court will survey the entire constitutional prob-
lem before it and set an initial focal point of analysis depending
upon the substantive issues involved. The court will then search
for the presence of state contacts in sufficient proximity with
the private conduct under attack. Where there is close and sub-
stantial proximity between the state and the private entity, there
will be state action.
WILLIAM W. WYNDER
[T]he state's support of I.I.T. is sufficiently significant to require a
finding of state action if that support has furthered the specific policies
or conduct under attack. . . . The state has lent significant support to
I.I.T.; it is not, however, alleged to have lent any support to any act of
discrimination.
While there may have been state action in the aggregate, there was none at the
point of conduct causing the alleged harm.
